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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, an increasing number of human resource
managers in the public sector realized that, for a variety of reasons, they needed
to upgrade their information system. Once they chose to follow the path of IS
conversion, they became aware of many of the same challenges that others have
faced in similar circumstances. Some managers began to realize that their
projects began to spiral out of control into the realm of failure sometimes without
their understanding the reasons why, in turn wasting vast sums of taxpayer
dollars in the process.
The public sector has had to take a step forward in recent decades from
the older and usually slower legacy systems that they relied on for previous
decades to systems that were promoted as more efficient and definitely more
complex. A vast array of knowledge, tools, and options has become available to
managers that are progressing through what is usually a long and uncertain
conversion process.
Despite the wealth of knowledge provided by researchers and those who
have already taken on the task of systems upgrades, IS projects still tend to fail.
There are different types and reasons for a project to fail which has prompted
many researchers to identify the causes and even to develop IS models for
success to assist others in their projects (DeLone & McLean , 1992). Human
resource managers of the public sector have the most to gain from closely
examining outcomes of past projects since research suggests that only 18
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percent of information systems projects ended successfully (when compared to
private sector segments retail:59%, financial: 32%, and manufacturing: 27%)
(Goldfinch, 2007).
This paper will begin by addressing what the specific challenges of IS
conversions with examples of certain issues that affected agencies in the past.
Challenges faced by the public sector are presented along with a few solutions.
The paper will then move on to the types and causes for some of the
documented information systems conversion failures. Failure types such as
abandonment, enthusiasm, and the troubles associated with outsourcing are
discussed with figures for emphasis. Finally, the paper will end with a look at
some methods for averting a project failure and, instead, end with success. Each
section will conclude with a discussion that will offer advice for the public sector
human resource manager considering a conversion to their information system.
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CHAPTER 2
PAST CHALLENGES
Challenges to Human Resource Management
Since the 1990’s many public sector managers have begun to address the
daunting issue of upgrading their legacy human resource information systems to
more modern and efficient architectures (Arnold, 2007). An example of a public
sector agency engaging in such a monumental task is the Arizona Department of
Administration’s system upgrade. The payroll component of their system alone
stored the records for nearly 45,000 state employees in addition to 35,000
employee and benefit records for retirees and state university system employees
(Arnold, 2007). The prospect of upgrading and the challenges included in the
process can certainly be quite intimidating across the spectrum from small to
large organizations. However, by researching what others have experienced
along the way and by thoroughly examining one’s own unique environment, the
challenges can be overcome successfully (Arnold, 2007).
Governments attempting to develop their own human resource information
systems have used many approaches. Some of the approaches included
spreadsheet/ database systems, homemade systems, and special “standalone”
applications. The first approach consisting of spreadsheet or database systems
are often used because of human resource managers not being satisfied with
some aspect of a financial management system. The dissatisfaction arises
because the system might be too limited in accommodating any other needs
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users may have. This solution may work for the HR department but may not be
accessible to other departments (Ashbaugh & Miranda, 2002).
The second approach refers to homemade systems built by larger
government agencies for things such as payroll. Homemade systems are those
that are built by in-house employees to solve an immediate need (Ashbaugh &
Miranda, 2002) However, once built, these systems lack scalability, or the ability
to modify or add on to them in order to adapt to new demands. Such systems
also run into problems with not being able to meet changes in regulations,
professional standards, or organizational restructuring (Ashbaugh & Miranda,
2002).
The third approach by governments to address their human resource
management requirements was to use specialized “standalone” applications.
Numerous software applications were designed for specific needs such as
applicant tracking, compensation/benefits planning, and risk management.
These applications are typically cheaper than the homemade systems. However,
they tend to increase the problems associated with data redundancy (Ashbaugh
& Miranda, 2002). Data redundancy is simply the replication of the same data
across either the same system or several systems. Data redundancy increases
the chances of data errors since there are several different copies of the original
data that may not be updated consistently (Ashbaugh et al. 2002).
The core problem with the previous government solutions are that they
rarely connected the rest of the agency’s departments or were not compatible
with other systems. In addition, in many cases, different software vendors had
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to be used to create software for “financial” applications such as accounting,
budgeting, and purchasing while a completely different software package was
needed for the Human Resource Information System’s needs such as benefits
administration and payroll (Ashbaugh & Miranda, 2002).
The need for many different types of software programs in an organization
lead to a few complications. First, software packages tend to get larger and more
complex as the years go by and tend to take up vast amounts of space on
computers, whether it is a personal computer or a central server. Next is the
problem of needing more storage to store software, which can get very
expensive rather quickly. Finally, with data having to be copied for the many
different software applications scattered around an organization one can develop
a problem with data redudancy and data errors. One proven way of eliminating
most of the challenges listed above is to use Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) (Ashbaugh & Miranda, 2002).

To Replace or Not to Replace
Many smaller government agencies may question the need for something
as large and encompassing as an Enterprise Resource Planning system.
However, once the dust settles, agencies that have already implemented an
HRIS often realize significant advantages over an older system. Studies
conducted indicated that the road to a successful HRIS implementation is often
rocky and treacherous at best (McNurnin & Sprague, 2006). Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) studied the issue in twenty-one manufacturing companies, service
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firms, and government organizations in North America, Europe, and Japan. The
consulting firm noted that of the 21 projects they compared, only twelve were
successful in that they worked and had a bottom line impact. The study’s other
nine projects were either labeled unsuccessful or did not deliver the desired
results (McNurnin & Sprague, 2006).
When considering to replace an existing system, Boston Consulting Group
recommended performing three analyses. First, they recommend conducting a
rigorous analysis to determine costs and benefits of a new system (McNurnin &
Sprague, 2006). Apparently most companies end up grossly underestimating the
cost of replacing a system and overestimating the attainable value. Many
organizations also fail to factor failure as a risk. The second recommended
analysis is to determine how specialized the new system will be. Companies
often think that they need a made to order system when all they really need is a
purchased solution. In most cases, their requirements are not as unique as they
would believe. Finally, the third analysis should focus on honestly assessing the
staff’s capabilities (McNurnin et al.2006). Several companies in the study failed
to develop a replacement system because management had overrated the staff’s
skills. Projects often fail because the processes involved in such a change prove
to be beyond the capabilities of the people working on it.

Upgrading Options: Enterprise Resource Planning
The major goal of introducing ERP systems was to replace all of the
various systems used in finance, manufacturing, and administration with a single
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platform of interconnected modules that serve the previously listed functions
(McNurnin & Sprague, 2006).

Figure 1. The ERP Concept (Ashbaugh p.10).
Table 1. ERP Component Breakdown (Ashbaugh p.10).
ERP Component
Financial

System-Wide Features

HRIS

Technology Architecture

Applications
General Ledger, Accounts Payable, Accounts
Receivable, Billing, Budget Preparation, fixed
Assets/ Inventory, Grant Accounting
Development Tools, Security, Workflow,
Internet/ Intranet, Reporting/ Querying, Drill
down/ Audit trails, Document management
Applicant Tracking, Benefits Administration,
Employee Records, Payroll, Pension
Administration, Risk Management, Time and
Labor, Employee/ Manager Self-Service
Common Database (DBMS), Client/Server/
Web Enablement, Desktop Integration,
Import/Export, Graphical User Interfaces, Data
Warehouses/Business Portals

Figure 1 above illustrates how an HRIS becomes one of several integrated
modules that connect a central or common database. Table 1 breaks down
each of the ERP components by the applications that comprise it. By connecting
the different functions into a central location, data redundancy becomes much
easier to control and eliminate. Enterprise Resource Planning is a potential
source for salvation for most organizations. The modularity allows managers not
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just from human resources but from the entire organization to have access to the
same data which is transformed into information to suit the user’s needs. The
typical common database at the center of an ERP usually contains some sort of
database management system (dbms) that acts as a data scrubber as well as a
means of storage (McNurnin et al., 2006). An example of data scrubbing would
be to eliminate multiple versions of the same data record such as having multiple
addresses for the same person or having one record for John Doe and Johnny
Doe. Excess records are eliminated allowing for an increase in efficiency in the
overall system (Rob & Coronel, 2007).
The ERP system is a great means for increasing an agency’s overall
operational efficiency. However, human resource managers should carefully
figure the costs involved with implementing an ERP. The ERP itself consists of a
software package that may easily cost in the millions (Burleson, 2001). A survey
conducted by TechRepublic in 2001 illustrated that 79.4% of those responding
paid less than $5 million for their ERP implementation, 10% paid $5-10 million,
and 10.6% paid more than $10 million. It is critical for a manager to consider that
they will not just be paying for the software package but should also allow for
training costs as well. For example, if one pays $2 million for their ERP software,
it would be wise to expect to pay an additional $6-8 million for consulting services
to get the system operational (Burleson, 2001).
The benefits of installing an ERP in an organization, especially in
government, are numerous because it allows the HR managers to have a higher
degree of control over their assigned areas than they ever had before. With an
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ERP, human resource managers can access important information regarding
their department or any department from anywhere inside the building in which
they work by way of an intranet, an Internet accessible only to employees of an
organization. Extranets are another advantage gained by companies using an
ERP. Extranets are a means for outside business clients of an organization to
communicate securely with their designated contacts on the inside (McNurnin &
Sprague, 2006).
Most importantly, such ERP systems would also reduce costs related to
productivity losses caused by data errors. Since taxpayers are always
monitoring how the government is using their money, it becomes most
advantageous to have an Enterprise Resource Planning system to reduce overall
costs and speed up the internal processes of their government.

Options: Using Analysts
For the reasons described above, it may not always be in the best
interests of an HR manager to take on a project as vast as upgrading the HRMS
by in-house personnel. To avoid missed completion dates and runaway budgets,
managers may consider calling in the expertise of a consulting firm that
specializes in starting, running, and implementing complex system projects.
Several tools exist for assisting analysts in taking a system from being an idea to
a fully functional HRIS.
The first tool used in either upgrading a system or creating an entirely new
one would be the systems development life cycle (SDLC) (Hoffer, George, &
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Valacich, 2006). The SDLC (figure 2) uses several phases to mark the progress
of a systems design and analysis project. Typically, there are five phases
(Planning, Analysis, Design, Implementation, and Maintenance) to the SDLC
method however; it depends on the organization as to how many phases they
may use.

Figure 2. The Systems Development Life Cycle

In the planning phase, someone declares the need for a newer or
upgraded system (Hoffer, George, & Valacich, 2006). In the analysis phase, the
current system and procedures are thoroughly studied along with what the users
of the system would want from a proposed system. At the end of the Analysis
phase, the analysis team proposes an alternative solution to the initial problem,
which is either accepted or rejected by those funding the project. During the
design phase, the accepted recommendation is converted into both logical and
physical system specifications. The logical specification consists of the system
only existing on paper or in a computer as a blueprint. The physical specification
comprises the hardware and software requirements needed to bring the system
together in reality.

Project implementation is the phase in which the consultants

will bring everything together into a working system. The final phase is
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maintenance, in which the documentation is provided along with the ongoing
adjustment for better performance (Hoffer et al., 2006).
The SDLC functions as a backbone to project development and is often
used in conjunction with other tools. In prototyping, analysts and users (HR
personnel) get together and build a basic system and then rework it until they get
it to a point at which the users are happy with it (Hoffer, George, & Valacich,
2006). Analysts will then use a type of Computer- Aided Software Engineering
(CASE) tool, a type of software used for diagramming, storage, and report
generating. Joint Application Design (JAD) consists of users, managers, and
analysts coming together for a series of intensely structured meetings and run by
a leader who maintains project discipline (Hoffer et al.2006). Project managers
who decide to use JAD do so in order to better manage their time and resources
more efficiently while also allowing the human resources personnel (the system
users) to have a better understanding of their new system. Rapid Application
Development (RAD) is a method that promises better and cheaper systems with
a more rapid deployment by having the system developers and users work
together jointly in real time to develop a system (Hoffer et al.,2006). These tools
are just a few of the ones analysts may use to bring a project from concept to
completion, and are described here to help reveal some of the benefits with using
expert analysts to save a government agency large sums of time and money.
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Implementation
Once the new system has been constructed, either by in-house means or
through outside analysts, the final implementation phase reveals a final round of
challenges for any governmental human resource manager. Upgrades,
implementation, and training are all important issues that HRIS mangers must
contend with (“One Organization’s” S4). According to Roberts (2004), an
organization might use either a phased rollout or a “big bang” (p.89) rollout,
depending on the scope of the implementation and the experience of users that
will be working with the new system (Roberts, 2004). “Both approaches work”,
says Bill Henry, vice president for strategy at PeopleSoft Inc., based in
Pleasanton, CA. “The real issue is understanding the degree of change your
organization can accept. The bigger the change, the more we recommend the
phased approach” (p 89).

Case Study: United States Department of Agriculture
In the mid-1990s, the USDA initiated a reengineering project centered on
its human resources, procurement, and financial managements utilizing the
services of PeopleSoft (PeopleSoft 7). The use of PeopleSoft 7 eventually would
trouble the project when the software company released a newer version
(PeopleSoft 8) during the implementation of version 7. The HRIS specialists
decided a phased rollout using eight phases would be best because the project
was nationwide and because it would be easier to train smaller groups of HR
users (Roberts, 2004).
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During the rollout of PeopleSoft 7, the users were moving from oldfashioned green-screened terminals connected to a mainframe to desktop
personal computers (PCs). Many users had never used a mouse before. To
accommodate the unanticipated need for PC training found in the first phase of
the rollout, the training team reacted by implementing PC basics training in the
second and later phases (Roberts, 2004). The ability to fix unanticipated
problems gradually is just one example of the benefits of the phased rollout.
A second major impact of the PeopleSoft, as discussed by Roberts
(2004), was that it generated a large amount of resistance from users who began
asking, “What’s wrong with the old process?” (p 92). Here again is where the
phased rollout was preferable: it allowed the first groups to like the new system,
after they got used to it, they began to spread the word about their positive
experience to people in the later groups with the effect of lessening resistance.
The biggest drawback of the phased rollout in this circumstance was the need to
have both the older and newer systems running at the same time, bogging down
the HR staff when they had issues with employees and had to constantly
alternate back and forth between the two systems to find that employee’s
information (Roberts, 2004).
In May 2002, the green light was given to the project manager to upgrade
to PeopleSoft 8. There was a major change in architecture between the two
versions. Version 7 was client-server (part of the application sits on a server and
part sits on the user’s desktop) while version 8 was web based (the entire
application sits on a server and is accessed through a web browser and no
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software is needed on the user’s desktop). Even though there was a major
change in the architecture between the two versions of PeopleSoft, there was
less of a need for change management (training of personnel required for the
new software version) for version 8 than version 7 (Roberts, 2004).
When it came time to rollout PeopleSoft 8, a “big bang” approach was
used successfully because the users were already acclimated to using PCs. It
was determined that the USDA’s work community was ready for the change
which convinced the training team that “big bang” was the preferable choice for
the PeopleSoft 8 rollout. If the “big bang” had been used during the PeopleSoft 7
rollout there would have been groups of users nationwide all at the same time
with issues pertaining to the lack of computer skills. Also, there would have been
a longer and more pronounced period of user resistance.

Discussion
As illustrated in the case study above, there was clearly a need for
government agencies to migrate from their older, decentralized human resource
management system to a more modern human resource information system.
Many challenges arose for managers considering going through with a
modernization, such as knowing if they are ready to take on a large-scale and
time-consuming project like a systems upgrade, how to integrate separate
systems into one agency-wide system (enterprise system), and what tools they
should use for their specific needs (analysts, CASE, and the SLDC). Human
resource managers need to carefully consider the costs of some of the tools that
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are available to them so that a tool does not turn into a budget disaster. The next
section focuses on information system implementation failures and some of the
reasons they fail.
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CHAPTER 3
FAILURES OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Overview
The previous section of this paper discussed the challenges managers
may face when they decide to start down the path of an information system
upgrade and the tools that are available to assist them once they start down that
path. Yet, despite all of the research and information that is available about the
various aspects of information systems projects, there are many documented
instances of project failures. A variety of factors may cause a project to fail in a
variety of ways. Some of the factors for failure include: project abandonment,
problems related to enthusiasm, and lack of creativity from management.
Managers deciding to face the challenges of implementing a new information
system in their agency need to be aware of why so many projects fail in order for
them to avoid repeating some of the mistakes that others have made. This
section focuses on naming some of the major reasons for project failure.

Measures of Failure
Research suggests that there are many ways one can measure an IS
project’s failure. Goldfinch (2007) states that a project can be considered a
failure when it does one (or more) of the following: 1) The project’s costs exceed
the previously allocated funding resulting in it being over budget,; 2) The project
falls behind the originally agreed upon time schedule,; 3) Upon completion, a
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project is delivered with fewer functions than previously specified (p 919). In
addition, a project’s benefits may not offset the incurred costs of developing it
leading it to be labeled as a failure (Goldfinch, 2007).

Public vs. Private Sector Failures
Public sector IS failures happen for mostly the same reasons as private
sector projects do: going over budget, beyond time schedules, and lacking all
features upon completion. However, public sector projects tend to fail more often
because of some additional factors not found in the private sector. One factor
the public sector has that the private does not is Max Weber’s separation of
policy makers from the administrators in the public bureaucracy (Berkley &
Rouse, 2004). The policy makers are typically the elected politicians while
administrators are the experienced professionals. This difference alone creates
problems with public projects’ budgets being monetarily constricted and inflexible
to change. Public agencies are driven by their poor funding to seek out the
cheapest deal they can which typically backfires for them (Bentham, 2007).
Suppliers who sell their products for cheap prices tend to take advantage of the
public agency later through numerous revisions. The added costs through
revisions can push a project over budget (Bentham 2007).

Abandonment
Even though failure and information systems appear to go hand-in-hand,
project abandonment is a facet of IS failure that is less widely known (Przasnyski
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& Ewusi-Mensah, 1991). Abandonment occurs when management changes its
direction, for a variety of reasons, and either temporarily or permanently halts a
project under development. Abandonment may result from cost overruns, scope
creep (the slow increase in project size and budget due to poor project
management discipline), technology inadequacies; and behavioral, political, or
organizational issues (Przasnyski & Ewusi-Mensah, 1991). A memorable point
was made by Keider (1984) who said, “although some projects fail because of
technology or design problems, [the main reasons] for project failure indicate a
lack of understanding of project management.” (p. 38).
Project abandonment itself does not necessarily mean complete and utter
failure in each occurrence, however. Instead it can come in one of three forms
related to severity (Przasnyski & Ewusi-Mensah, 1991). The first level is partial
abandonment, which is when the original scope of a project is scaled back
without incurring major alterations to the original specifications of the project.
Substantial project abandonment is the next level, which occurs when there is a
radical change in a project away from the original specifications. Total
abandonment is the highest level of abandonment, resulting from the complete
shutdown of all project activity before it is fully implemented (Przasnyski & EwusiMensah, 1991).
Expectation failure is a cause of failure fueled by the perceptions of people
involved in the project (Przasnyski & Ewusi-Mensah, 1991). Expectation failure
is a perceived inability of a project to fulfill the expectations of the project’s
stakeholders. Stakeholders of an information systems project may include 1) any
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management personnel who make decisions regarding the future of the agency
and who have control of funding for the project,; 2) the information systems
professionals who are responsible for the technical components of the project,;
and 3) the end users who may or may not view a new project or system
favorably. Any one of the three stakeholders may perceive there to be a problem
with a new project and begin to steer that project toward failure (Przasnyski &
Ewusi-Mensah, 1991).

Problems with Enthusiasm
The literature on the subject of information systems failures is riddled with
horror stories (along with the corresponding data) that truly boggle the mind.
Most information systems projects are eventually deemed unsuccessful, with the
larger projects being more likely to result in failure (Goldfinch, 2007). Of course,
the success of a project depends on how exactly it is measured: Generally, 20 to
30 percent of all developments are total failures that result in abandonment, 30 to
60 percent are partial failures, and only a few are considered successes
(Goldfinch, 2007). An estimate of projects in the United States from 2001
indicated that size did matter according to which ones failed. Interestingly,
Goldfinch (2007) stated that the success rate for projects under $750,000 had a
success rate of 55 percent while those with budgets over $10 million had no
reported successes (p.917)! Goldfinch (2007) also indicated that government
information systems projects only had a success rate of 18 percent while the
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retail, financial, and manufacturing sectors had success rates of 59 percent, 32
percent, and 27 percent respectively (p. 917).
Among the reasons for failures in public sector information systems is the
misguided belief that the best course for an agency to pursue is one that involves
the inclusion of the biggest system with the newest technology available at the
time (Goldfinch, 2007). This apparently is not always in an agency’s best
interests, as the United Kingdom found out when they began an upgrade of its
National Health Service at a cost of $11 billion, which was largest public sector
project ever (as of 2002) (Goldfinch, 2007). Big, new, shiny systems that come
with all the bells and whistles frequently get public agencies in over their heads
ultimately leading to project failure.
Despite the history of failed information systems projects, more failures
continue to occur. Goldfinch (2007) proposed an explanation of why public
agencies continue to pursue ambitious projects by pointing out what he called the
“four pathological enthusiasms” (p. 921). The first of Goldfinch’s (2007)
enthusiasms was idolization, or an infatuation with technology by public officials.
Goldfinch recanted Heeks’ and Davies’ (1999) statement that public officials:
“Use computers and are overaware (sic) of IT’s potential. They believe that IT
can transform the business of government. The public sector becomes awash
with IT driven reform projects, which place technology at the heart of the change
process” (p. 27).

Public officials have a history of letting the excitement of a proposed new system
get the better of them.
The second type of enthusiasm that proves to be detrimental, according to
Goldfinch (2007), is technophilia or the “myth of the technological fix” (p.921).
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This enthusiasm propagates through the professionals in the information systems
field, aka geeks, who are hooked on the premise that the answer to practical
problems is to throw copious amounts of newer technology at it. Information
technology professionals tend to be captivated by new technologies and the
challenges they promise. The lure of new technology, acting almost like an
opiate, can overcome their reason and allow them to paint themselves into a
corner with a large, expensive, and complex system (Goldfinch, 2007).
Goldfinch’s (2007) third and fourth enthusiasms are what he calls
lomanism (a reference to a character in Death of a Salesman) and managerial
faddism, respectively. Lomanism, as described by Goldfinch (2007), is the
enthusiasm of the sales representative or company officials who promote their
company’s new products. The sellers have no choice but to hype-up their
products or risk the purchaser going to the next seller. This results in the sellers
projecting a sense of enthusiasm for their product that does have an effect on the
purchasers being coerced into making the purchase (Goldfinch, 2007). The
fourth enthusiasm covered by Goldfinch (2007) was managerial faddism, or:
“The tendency of consultants and mangers to eagerly embrace the newest
management fad, methodology, or uttering of the management guru of the
moment.”(p 921).

This enthusiasm is related to how management sees IS projects as a means to
an end in improving management structures in their public agency environment.
Public sector managers are locked, or trapped, in a state of competition with the
private sector for newer technologies or risk appearing obsolete and resistant to
change (p 922 ).
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Failures Related to Outsourcing
Currently faced with harsh budget cuts, government agencies along with
some small business owners must make hard decisions if and when they need to
upgrade their information systems. Many small agencies simply do not have
budgets that allowed them to have their own dedicated IT personnel to research
or implement information systems and so they turn to outsourcing as a means for
them to address their information system needs (Devos, Landeghem, &
Deschoolmeester, 2008).
As stated before, there are many types of systems failures with a few
being expectation failure and termination failure. (Devos, Landeghem, &
Deschoolmeester, 2008). Expectation failure relates to failures of
correspondence, process, and interaction that cause a project to fail to meet
stakeholder’s expectations. Termination failure occurs when stakeholders
abandon a project altogether, or abandonment (Devos et al. 2008). A third type
of failure discussed by Devos et al. (2008) is Outsourced IS Failure (OISF),
which occurs when a project is a part of an outsourced environment. Failures
contributed to outsourcing happen because of three interrelated factors:
information asymmetry, goal differences, and risk behavior differences,(Devos et
al. 2008).
When discussing problems with outsourcing, it helps to think of
outsourcing as an exchange between two parties: a principal (the one seeking a
service) and an agent (the provider of services) (Devos, Landeghem, &
Deschoolmeester, 2008). The first of the outsourcing failures, information
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asymmetry, occurs when the agent has information about the true quality of their
product information system that they keep hidden from the principals, allowing
the agent to gain the upper hand in negotiations. Information asymmetry leads to
a principal not being given the opportunity to differentiate a good IS from a bad
one. The goal differences between the parties (one party hiding information and
the other searching for the best information to make the best purchase) comprise
the second factor of outsourcing failure. Goal differences tend to be conflicts of
interest that arise between a principal and an agent. The third type of
outsourcing failure, risk behavior differences, is attributed to the frequently
immeasurable outcomes of information system implementation which give rise to
increased uncertainty. It is the principal who tends to become overconfident in
their sense of certainty because they are not fully aware of the agent’s intentions
nor can they see what the end result will be until it is too late (Devos et al. 2008).
Overall, outsourcing appears to be a solution for many small organizations
with small budgets that are in need of some service related to information
systems. However, outsourcing itself has had its own causes of failure.
Managers should make themselves fully aware of some of the challenges that
may arise when considering the option of outsourcing.

Discussion
A project can fail for reasons such as abandonment, over-enthusiastic
stakeholders, and issues related to outsourcing to name a few. According to
studies conducted on the subject, the government has the worst record when it
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comes to the number of successes among the studied sectors (Goldfinch, 2007).
The size of the information systems projects appears to correlate to the risk of a
given project’s failure. Many stakeholders feel as though they need to get the
latest and greatest in new technology when they really do not need to and this
frequently leads to failure as well. The decisions of management are what move
a project along from concept to creation and they need to make good decisions
so that they may choose the best solutions to the challenges that have derailed
so many others.
When considering taking on a project with the scope of an information
systems conversion, there are a few key points managers should review. The
first is that they should take a hard look at their knowledge of project
management and assess their ability to maintain discipline over a project. This
will help ensure that a project will not go over budget or run beyond completion
times. Next, human resource managers should not give in to the enthusiasms of
systems sellers nor their technical professionals. Technical enthusiasms may
overinflate the need for a brand new information system. Finally, managers
should be mindful of the intentions of outsourcing agents or risk being taken
advantage of due to a lack of technical knowledge on the manger’s part. The
outsourcing agent’s primary concern is to sell their product whether the manager
know what they are doing or not.
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CHAPTER 4
SUCCESSES
Overview
After discussing the challenges of upgrading human resource information
systems and some of the reasons some of them fail, it would not do to conclude
this paper without addressing what makes a successful system. Of course, no
two systems are exactly the same, and failures always stand out when doing
research on the subject more than the successes. The research on the subject
of information systems success reveals that defining what constitutes a success
can be just as ambiguous, or even more so, than a failure. The research also
takes a more optimistic turn by suggesting that just because a project runs into
trouble does not mean that it will fail. To the contrary, success may yet be
achieved.

The DeLone and McLean IS Success Model
When doing research on HRIS successes, two names always seem to find
mention: Drs. William H. DeLone and Ephraim R. McLean. DeLone, (currently
the interim Executive Director for the Center for Teaching, Research, and
Learning at the American University’s Department of Information Technology,
Washington DC.) (William DeLone, 2011) and McLean (Chairman at Georgia
State University’s Department of Computer Information Systems) (Ephraim R.
McLean, 2011) are known world-wide for their studies and work in the field of
information systems. Their report (DeLone & McLean, 1992), updated ten years
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later, presented what is known as the DeLone and McLean Information Systems
Success Model, which was to be used as a framework form measuring the
elusive topic of IS success (DeLone & McLean , 2003).
The IS success model creates a more coherent knowledge base from
previous research and to act as a guide for future research endeavors (DeLone
& McLean , 2003). DeLone and McLean’s model incorporated six interrelated,
rather than independent, dimensions of success to be used for the measurement,
analysis, and reporting of IS success in empirical studies (DeLone et al. 2003).
The interrelated dimensions consisted of: system quality, information quality, use,
user satisfaction, individual impact, and organizational impact. Table 2 below
gives a more detailed description of each of the DeLone’s and McLean’s six
dimensions.
Table 2. Breakdown of the IS Success Model (p. 64)
Dimension of IS Model
Information Quality
System Quality
System Use
User Satisfaction
Individual Impact

Organizational Impact

What is Measured
Accuracy, timeliness, completeness, relevance,
and consistency.
Ease of use, functionality, reliability, flexibility,
data quality, portability, integration, and
importance.
Frequency of use, time of use, number of
accesses, usage patterns , and dependency
Manager’s overall satisfaction with the IS
system, manager’s attitudes
The degree that the system has improved
department productivity or improved individual
decision making process.
Degree of operating cost reduction, increases:
profits, return on investment, number of
functional computer applications.
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System
Quality

Use

Individual
Impact
Information
Quality

Organizational
Impact

User
Satisfaction

Figure 3. DeLone and McLean’s Information Systems Success Model (p. 87)

According to DeLone and McLean (1992), the dimension of user
satisfaction is the one most used by researchers to measure IS success. There
are three reasons for user satisfaction being the chosen favorite which include: 1)
Satisfaction has a high degree of validity because system success is hard to
deny when users claim that they like it,; 2) There are many proven tools for
measuring satisfaction among users and comparing results,; and 3) Most of the
other dimensions are poor measures of success due to their weakness or
difficulty in obtaining empirical data (DeLone & McLean, 1992). According to
DeLone and McLean (1992), the dimensions consisting of individual and
organizational impact were the one that were the hardest to measure.
Since their original model was published in 1992, DeLone and McLean
(2003) updated there IS Success Model to include the dimension of net benefits
as the final success dimension in place of individual and organizational impacts.
This alteration in their model attempts to show more of a causal relationship
between use and user satisfaction. Figure 4 illustrates how use and user
satisfaction will cause a change in perceived net benefits of the system. The
dimension of net benefits will positively feed back into system use and user
satisfaction when the project owner percieves their to be positive net benefits
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from the new system. When the owner perceives there to be positive net benefits
as a result of positive user satisfaction and system use, the owner can declare
their system a success. Net benefits can also have the negative effect when
there is a lack of percieved positive benftis. The negative feedback can cause a
decreased use of the system and poor user satisfaction resulting in a system
failure (DeLone & McLean 2003).

Figure 4. DeLone and McLean’s Updated IS Success Model (p.24)

Overall, DeLone and McLean (1992) indicated that focusing on just one of
the dimensions does not give one an accurate measure of success. Instead, they
suggest averaging all of the dimensions together to get the best measure of
success. The six dimensions are interrealted where system and information
quality singulary and together affect both system use and user satisfaction. The
same can be said of how system use can, positively or negatively, affect user
satisfaction. In the end, indiviual dimensions by themsevles do not tell the whole
story of an information system’s success (DeLone & McLean,1992). DeLone and
McLean’s (1992) IS Success model is, of course, just one method for
attempting to guage systems success.
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De-escalation
Once a project has taken a turn for the worse, all hope of turing it around
into a success is not lost. The term that describes this turn- around of events is
de-escalation (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). Typically, managers escalate their
failure through poor decision making, false perceptions, and the inabillity to
obtain accurate information (to name a few). According to Montealegre et al.
(2000), there are four phases that lead to de-escalation: 1) problem recognition,
2) re- examination of the prior course of action, 3) searches for alternate courses
of action, and 4) the implementation of an exit strategy (p.417).

Case Study: Denver International Airport
The authors Montealegre and Keil (2000) applied their concept of deescalation to the construction of Denver International Airport’s computerized
baggage handling system. The baggage system, tasked with moving a person’s
baggage to any point in the airport in 15 minutes and processing nealry 1,000
bags per minute, was riddled with problems from the start that threatened to
delay the airport’s opening (Montealegre and Keil 2000). The problem recognition
phase was easily identified when reporters were invited to observe a test of the
system only to have it fail miserably, with “Piles of discarded clothes and other
personal items lying beneath the telecar’s tracks.” (p.424) . After much debate
and finger- pointing, an outside German consulting firm was chosen by the
stakeholders to assess the state of the beleaguered baggage system.
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After identifying the problems, the mayor of Denver was forced to reexamine his previous course of action (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). The
prospects of costing the city tens of millions of dollars per month by having it
closed and the risk of losing federal grant money prompted the mayor (expected
to run for re-election the following year) to form a task force to find alternatives to
the computerized baggage system (Montealegre and Keil 2000).
The task force proposed implementing a temporary baggage system that
would be for up to two years while the bugs in the permanent system were
resolved (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). This alternative course of action was a
major turn in the project’s management. There were still complaints, especially
those of the air carriers (United), who felt their aircraft turnaround times
threatened by the alternate system. Montealegre and Keil’s (2000) final stage,
implementing an exit strategy, was carried out by re-negotiating the contracts
between the City of Denver, United, and BAE Automated Systems (the company
that designed the troubled automatic baggage system). The final solution was
rather complex with regards to which parts of the airport received the alternative
baggage systems (the original computerized design was scrapped). The end
result, and the one that is probably most important, was that the stakeholders
were able to identify their problem, change course, and then implement a new
system that would work for the airport (Montealegre and Keil, 2000).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Many human resource managers proved that they are not aware of the
challenges of converting their older methods of management system to a newer
information system. Vast amounts of research exist today regarding how prior
agencies, both public and private, dealt with the daunting challenge of upgrading
their system. Managers need to consider whether they and their staff are up to
the challenge of converting their system and if they are fully aware of what it
entails. There are several options for managers such as enterprise resources
management, outsourcing, as well as a variety of tools designed specifically for
upgrading information systems.
Despite the wealth of information regarding information systems
conversions, many failures still occur. Research indicates that there are many
causes for failure including project abandonment, enthusiasm, and outsourcing.
Causes for failure range from inexperienced management to users who lack the
skills needed to utilize a newer system and stakeholders that withdraw support
for a project before it is completed.
Project successes are often overshadowed by the failures while
conducting research however, they do happen and managers need to give them
equal consideration. Successes in information systems frequently relate to work
done by Drs. DeLone and McLean with their Information Systems Success Model
(DeLone & McLean , 1992). Their work illustrates which parts of a system are
more likely to relate to overall system success and should require more focus
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from management. Even though a system conversion may appear to be heading
down the path of failure, sometimes a manager can de-escalate the troubled
project by recognizing their problem and re-examining their options.
After reviewing the challenges, failures, and successes of information
systems conversions in the public sector, this paper will end with a few points of
advice for human resource managers. The manager needs to know, first, if their
agency is in the position to afford what usually turns out to be a costly venture.
Once they proceed past the question of affordability, the manager needs to know
whether all stakeholders (i.e.: staff and users) are prepared to see the project to
its completion without faltering. Managers should also take a close look at their
own project management skills because research shows that many projects fail
because of inadequacies in this skill (Keider 1984). A manager needs to be fully
aware of the many ways projects have failed in the past so that they may avoid
making the same mistakes when they assume the responsibility.
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